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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Respondent & Petitioner,

*
*
*
*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
APPELLATE CASE NO: 930017-CA

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
BY & THROUGH THE OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY DIVISION,
Complainant & Respondent.

PRIORITY NO. 7

*

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and §63-46b-16(1)•

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A.
err

when

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah ("the Commission")
it

issued

a

final

decision

in

favor

of

the Utah

Occupational Safety Division ("UOSH") , in view of the fact that the
only issue before the Commission was the Magnesium Corporation of
America's

("Magcorp") Motion For Summary Judgment?
1

This issue

involves the Commission's

adherence

to proper

decision

making

procedures and is reviewed under a "correction of error" standard
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e).
B.

If

the

Commission's

decision

in

this

matter

is

procedurally defective, should the Court remand the matter to the
Commission for correction of the procedural error.
a

question

authority.

of

general

law,

subject

to

this

This issue is

Court's

plenary

King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,

1285 (Utah App. 1993).
C.

As

to

Magcorp's

challenge

of

the

Commission's

jurisdiction, was the Commission's extension of the period in which
UOSH was required to file its Motion For Review supported by the
evidence and permitted by applicable law?

The question of the

Commission's jurisdiction is one of general law, reviewed under a
correction of error standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b16(4)(b).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-l(9):
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods established for
judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8:
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
2

and (ii), in all formal adjudicative
hearing shall be conducted as follows:

proceedings, a

(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all
parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal
evidence.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12f1):
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of
an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the
aggrieved party may file a written request for review
within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purposes by the
statute or rule.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(1):
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final
agency
action resulting
from
formal
adjudicative
proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(4):
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if,
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which
the
agency
action
is
based,
is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
3

(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or
were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated
to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-17(b):
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;
(iii)set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action;
or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3(2)(a):
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;

4

NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Magcorp , s brief correctly sets forth the proceedings before
the Commission, as well as the facts and the nature of this case.
For ease of reference, a summary of the facts that are particularly
significant to the Commission's position are set forth below:
UOSH cited Magcorp for certain safety violations,
Magcorp contested the citations

(R. 00001)

(R. 00006) and the dispute was

referred to an ALJ for adjudication.

Magcorp filed a Motion For

Summary Judgment asking the ALJ to dismiss the citations.
00014)

On June

10, 1992, the ALJ

signed

an Order

(R.

granting

Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment with respect to one of the
citations.

(R. 00169)

the other citation.

Magcorp then withdrew its opposition to

(R. 00314)

Both Magcorp and UOSH were aware that the ALJ had signed his
Order granting Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment on June 10,
1992.

(R. 00286)

of that Order.

However, counsel for UOSH did not receive a copy

After several days, UOSH's counsel obtained a copy

of the Order from the file.

(R. 00226)

The copy of the Order so

obtained carried a Certificate of Mailing dated June 16, 1992.
(R. 00175)
On July 16, 1992, 30 days after the date on the Order's
mailing certificate, UOSH filed its Motion For Review asking the
5

Commission to reverse the ALJ / s Order and to deny Magcorp's Motion
For Summary Judgment.

(R. 00177)

Ultimately, the Commission

issued an Order that not only denied Magcorp's Motion For Summary
Judgment, but also affirmed the citations that had been imposed by
UOSH against Magcorp.

(R. 00336 to 340)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("the Commission") concedes
that its decision in this matter is in error in some respects.
In particular, the Commission erred in deciding the merits of
this case when the only issue before it was Magcorp's Motion For
Summary Judgment. While the Commission believes it properly denied
summary

judgment,

considered

it

acknowledges

the underlying

merits

of

that
the

it

should

case.

not

Instead,

have
the

Commission should have remanded the case to an ALJ for a full
evidentiary hearing.
The appropriate remedy for the Commission's error is remand of
the case to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing and final
decision.
With

respect

to

Magcorp's

challenge

to

the

Commission's

jurisdiction, the Commission properly found that UOSH had good
cause for its delay in filing its Motion For Review.

For that

reason, the Commission extended the period for filing, as permitted
6

by Utah's Administrative Procedures Act.

The Commission therefore

had jurisdiction to act upon the Motion For Review.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ISSUING A FINAL DECISION IN THIS
MATTER•
At the time the Commission issued its final decision, the only
issue before it was UOSH's Motion For Review, arguing that the ALJ
had erred when he granted Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment.
In

considering

concluded

UOSH's

that Magcorp was

Motion
not

For

Review,

entitled

to

the

summary

Commission
judgment.

Having made that determination, the Commission should have remanded
the case to the ALJ for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits.
Unfortunately,

instead

of

remanding

for

further

hearing,

the

Commission proceeded to consider and decide the underlying merits
of the case.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8 sets forth minimum requirements for
hearings in formal adjudications. Among those requirements are the
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct crossexamination, and submit rebuttal evidence. The procedure followed
in this case did not afford such opportunities to either party.

As

a result, neither Magcorp nor UOSH had an opportunity to fully

7

present its case to the initial decision maker or develop a record
sufficient for judicial review.
Under

the

foregoing

circumstances, the parties have

been

substantially prejudiced by the Commission's decision, which should
be

set

aside

by

this

Court.

D.B.

v.

Div.

of

Occupational

Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah App. 1989).
POINT TWO
THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER TO THE COMMISSION FOR
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-17(b) sets forth the types of relief
which may be granted by this Court on judicial review of agency
orders:
(b)

In

In granting relief, the court may:
(1) order agency action required by law;
(2) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;
(3) set aside or modify agency action;
(4) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency
action; or
(5) remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings.
this

evidentiary
therefore

be

case,

hearing

disputed
for

remanded

to

questions

resolution.
the

of
The

Commission

pursuant to §17(b)(5), above.

8

fact

require

proceeding

for

such

a

an

should
hearing,

POINT THREE
THE COURT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT T1IF COMMISSION DOES HAVE
JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER.
This case presents a peculiar situation where the interplay of
human error and a change in the law caused UOSH to file its Motion
For Review beyond the 3 0 day period usually allowed

for such

filings by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(a)(a).
At the time this dispute arose, in June 1992, this Court had
held

that

an administrative

agency's

order

was

"issued"

when

mailed.
We hold that "issue" as used in section 63-46b-14(3)(a)
means the date the agency action is properly mailed, as
accurately evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or
personally served. Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d
1199 (Utah App. 1992).
Although UOSH knew that the ALJ had signed his Order on June
10, 1992, the mailing certificate on the copy of the Order which
UOSH finally obtained showed a date of June 16, 1992.
Order was never mailed at all.

In fact, the

However, based on Wiggins, UOSH

concluded that it had until July 16, 1992 to file its Motion For
Review.

UOSH met that deadline.

In light of the foregoing, UOSH exercised reasonable care and
diligence in filing its Motion For Review.

While the ALJ's staff

may have mishandled the issuance of the ALJ's Order and may have
erred

in dating

the Order's mailing

9

certificate, UOSH had

no

control or knowledge of those errors.

It had a right to rely on

the date of indicated on the Order's mailing certificate.
In a similar vein, UOSH reasonably relied on this Court's
definition of "issued" in Wiggins and concluded that the ALJ's
Order had been issued on June 16, 1992.

Several months later, the

Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Dusty's. Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d
Dusty's

decision

administrative

held

agency

868

that

(Utah 1992)
the

date

(per curiam).

of

issuance

of

The
an

order was not the date of mailing, but

rather, the date on which it was signed.
Under the definition of "issued" announced in Dusty's, UOSH
should have filed its Motion For Review within 3 0 days of the date
on which the ALJ signed his Order, instead of 3 0 days from the date
on the Order's mailing

certificate.

However,

if the

Dusty's

definition of "issued" is applied retroactively to the facts of
this case, UOSH's actions will be judged according to a standard
that did not exist at the time those actions were taken.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(9) allows the Commission to extend
the period for filing motions for review upon a showing of good
cause. The Commission was cognizant of the foregoing circumstances
when it concluded that UOSH had shown good cause for an extension
of the filing deadline.

The Court should likewise conclude that

10

good cause exists for extension of the filing deadline for UOSH's
Motion For Review.
As

a

final

point,

Magcorp

argues

that

the

Commission

irrevocably lost jurisdiction to consider UOSH , s Motion For Review
when UOSH failed to file a request for extension of the filing
period within 3 0 days of the date on the ALJ's Order.

Magcorp's

argument is not supported by the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-l(9), which states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening
or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter,
except those time limits established for judicial review.
Nothing in §63-46b-l(9) compels a conclusion that requests for
extension must be filed within a particular time.

In many cases,

including the case at issue, the party who ultimately seeks an
extension does not know that the extension is required until after
the initial filing period is expired.
The foregoing issue was implicit in Maverik v. Industrial
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993).

There, a party filed a

Motion For Review with the Commission 31 days after the ALJ's
Order—one day after the 3 0 day period for filing such Motions had
expired.

The Commission concluded that the party did not have good

cause for missing the filing deadline and therefore refused to
extend the filing deadline.

The party then raised the issue on

11

appeal to this Court, arguing that the Commission had erred in not
extending the filing deadline.
The Maverik case is instructive to with respect to Magcorp's
argument here.

If, as Magcorp contends, a request for an extension

of a filing period must be made during the original filing period,
then the Court in Maverik would simply have dismissed Maverik's
argument, since Maverik did not request an extension during the
original filing period.

However, this Court did not so rule.

Instead, the Court considered the merits of Maverik , s claim for
good cause for an extension, and concluded Maverik had not shown
good cause.

Such an analysis would be unnecessary if Magcorp's

argument were correct.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission believes it properly
considered and granted Magcorp's request for an extension.

CONCLUSION
In summary, while the Commission believes it acted properly in
denying Magcorp 7 s Motion For Summary Judgment, the Commission erred
in also deciding the merits of this case.

The case should be

remanded for full evidentiary hearing and decision.
As to the Commission's jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b1(9) allows the Commission to extend the period for filing motions
for review, if good cause for extension is shown.
12

Based on the

unusual

circumstances

of

this

case,

the

Commission

properly

extended the period for UOSH to file its Motion For Review.

The

Commission therefore had jurisdiction to rule on the Motion For
Review.

7 Lv <?day of May, 1994.
Dated this A''*

A

JluSU.

By.
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused 2 rue and correct copies of
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH to be served upon
Petitioner MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA by causing to be placed
in an envelope addressed to the following:
Jerrald D. Conder
Attorney at Law
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
and said envelope was then deposited, sealed, with first class
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake
City, Utah on the 2nd day of May, 1994.

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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ADDENDUM A

15

CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY
Douglas J. McVey, Administrator
Industrial Commission of Utah
Occupational Safety and Health Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 519870
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0870
(801)530-6901

-

Fax

530-6804

:9/3/91
:105638639
Number
:H4844

Issuance Oate
Inspection

CSH0 I.D
Inspection Oate

:7/30/91 - 8/9/91
Inspection Site

:Rowley, 84029

To: Magnesium Corp. of America
238 North 2200 West
Salt Lake City, UT. 84116

CITATION AN0 NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY: The violation(s) described in this Citation are alleged to have occurred
on or about the day the inspection was made unless otherwise indicated in the description given below.

This

citation (or copy) must be posted at or near the location of alleged violation. The citation must be posted
until the violation is corrected or abated or for 3 working days, whichever is longer. Assessed penalties are
payable to the Industrial Commission unless a notice of contest is mailed to the Administrator as indicated
below.
CONTESTS AND APPEALS:

Employers may request an informal review by the U0SH Administrator of any citation,

proposed penalty or abatement period. Employees may request an informal review of the abatement period granted
to the employer.

Informal reviews do not stay the 30 days in which an employer must file a contest for a formal

hearing before the Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission will provide an adjudicative hearing if an employer files a written notice of contest
with the Administrator within 30 days of receipt of the Citation or Proposed Penalties. Upon expiration of the
30 day period the Citation and Proposed Penalties are final and not subject to review by any court or agency.
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS:

Any employee or representative of employees who believes that the periods of time fixed for

correction or abatement of a violation is unreasonable has the right to contest the periods of time by
submitting a letter to the Administrator within 30 days of issuance of the citation.
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee filed a
complaint

with

the division,

instituted

any proceeding

with

the division,

conversed

with

a division

representative, or testified in any proceeding or exercised any right afforded under the act, standards or rules
of the division.

Any employee who suffers adverse working conditions based on the above must contact the

Administrator within 30 days.
CITED ITEMS BEGIN ON FOLLOWING PAGE, AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE AND TOTAL PENALTIES APPEAR ON FINAL PAGE.

00 ;Oi

Oate Violation
Must Be Abated

Description

Penalty

OTHER
1

30 days from

UGSO R500-405-558.2.7

receipt of

$

500

citation
Solid decking shall be provided where a hazard exists of free flowing
hot material falling from one floor to another.
(A) Floor decking at Mag. Corp. such as, but not
limited to the reactor building around the
launder, where molten material could fall
from floor to floor was not solid decking
to eliminate the hazard of free flowing hot
material

Penalty

$2,700

Authorized signature:

Date: '? '^?/

V

^

00103

ADDENDUM B & C

15

JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Respondent
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone:
(801) 967-5500
Fax:
(801) 967-5563

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
BY AND THROUGH THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION,
Complainant,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

vs •

)
) Administrative Judge:
) Donald L. George
)

MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.

Magnesium

)
)
)
)

)

Corporation

of

America's

(Magcorp)

Motion

for

Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on the 17th day of
April, 1992, the Honorable Donald L. George presiding.
was

represented

Ivie.

Thomas

by

counsel, Jerrald

C.

Sturdy

appeared

Dccupational Safety and Health
pleadings on

D.
on

Conder
behalf

Commission.

Magcorp

and Michelle
of

the

J.

Utah

Having reviewed

the

file regarding the above-referenced motion and

the

~ourt having heard argument from each of the parties thereon, and
Deing

fully

advised

in the

premises, now makes

its Finding

?act and Conclusions of Law as follows:

001.83

of

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
notice

That on August 27, 1991 Magcorp receivd a citation and
of

resistant

penalty

for

protective

failure

clothing

to

in

require

the

use

the electrolytic

of

and

flame

reactor

sections of the facility in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132.
2.

That the citation and notice of penalty contained the

following note:
NOTE:

3.
codified

NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting
and casting areas shall wear flame resistant
clothing, non-foundry shoes and adequate
face protection.

That

UOSHA

into

the

agreed
Utah

that

NFPA

480-2-1.6

Administrative

Code

has

or

not

other

been
UOSHA

regulations pertaining to personal protective equipment.
4.

A material issue of disputed fact exists with regard to

whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 by not requiring the use
of flame resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and
reactor sections of the facility.
5.
abatement

That

the

order

citation

requiring

received

Magcorp

by

Magcorp

to bear

the

contained
cost

of

an

flame

resistant protective equipment required under the citation and
notice of penalty.
6.
to

wit,

That the personal protective equipment at issue herein,
coveralls,

are

uniquely

personal

to

each

individual

employee at Magcorp since the coveralls are individually fitted

-2-

to the employee, many bear the name of the individual employee,
and the coveralls are the type of garment that may be used by
employees away from the Magcorp facility.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That this court has jurisdiction over the parties in the

above-entitled matter.
2.

That disputed material issues of fact exist with regard

to whether Magcorp is in compliance with the requirements of 29
CFR 1910.132(a) and Summary Judgment on that issue is therefore
denied.
3.

That based upon the holding in Budd Co. v. OSHRC and

Federal OSHA Mandate, UOSHA has no legal or other authority to
impose the cost of uniquely personal protective equipment, such
as the coveralls at issue herein, upon Magcorp.
4.

That the Abatement Order contained in the UOSHA citation

to Magcorp requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant
coveralls

purportedly

required

under

29

CFR

1910.132(a)

is

unenforceable and void as a matter of law.
5.

Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Magcorp on the

issue of cost allocation under 29 CFR 1910.132(a).
DATED this /Qjftday of

JUx^*

, 1992.

Approved as to Form:

Thomas C. Sturdy
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify

that

on the

day of Mayf

1992, I

caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to the following:
Thomas C. Sturdy
Industrial Commission of Utah
Division of Legal Affairs
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

— A—

. i \ O -*w **=v -:.
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JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Respondent
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 9 67-5500
Fax: (801) 967-5563
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
BY AND THROUGH THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION,

O R D E R

Complainant,
vs.
Administrative Judge:
Donald L. George

MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Respondent,
Based

upon

the

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions

of

law

entered herein, and for good cause appearing^ it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Magcorp f s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on

the issue of cost allocation for personal protective equipment
required under 29 CFR 1910 • 132, and the abatement note contained
in the citation and notice of penalty issued in connection with
inspection no. 105638639, which required Magcorp to provide flame
resistant coveralls to Magcorp employees at no cost or financial
expense to the employees is void and unenforceable as a matter of
law.
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2.

That disputed issues of material fact exist with regard

to whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 and summary judgment
on this issue is denied.
DATED t h i s

fflj^day

of

Q

,

xJU<2

1992.

V

BY THE COURT:
Passed by the Industrial Coomlssioa
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, thl«

/6'tf-jtey

of

Ou*~^< >

,

19 ?^..

ATj

Commission Secretary^

..tfl

„

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/'

'O

T h o m a s C.

• / / '

Sturdy
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No, 105638639
Industrial Commission of Utah
*
by and through the Occupational *
Health and Safety Division,
*
Complainant,
vs.

*
*

Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*
*

INTERIM ORDER
DENYING MOTION
TO DISMISS

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Respondents Motion to Dismiss the Complainants Motion for Review
of the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dated June 10, 1992.
The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 35-9-12,
and Section 63-46b-12.
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 10,
1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium Corporation of
America (respondent or Magcorp) on the issue of whether the
Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Industrial
Commission of Utah (UOSH) could place the cost of providing flame
resistant coveralls for its employees on the respondent.
The
citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH required the
respondent to provide flame resistent coveralls to its employees at
no cost. The ALJ issued an order of summary judgment finding that
the citation was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The
ALJ further found that there were disputed issues of material fact
on the issue of whether the respondent violated 29 CFR 1910.13 2 for
its failure to require the use of flame resistent protective
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of its facility.
Although the order of the ALJ was signed on June 10, 1992, the
mailing certificate shows that the order was mailed on June 16,
1992. The UOSH filed a motion for review on July 16, 1992 pursuant
to 63-46b-12 seeking review of the order of summary judgment. The
respondent filed a motion to dismiss UOSH's motion for review for
untimeliness.
The respondent asserts that the ALJ's order was "issued" on June
10, 1992 because the order was executed in front of the party / s
attorneys and because Mr. Conder, attorney for Magcorp was
personally served a copy of the order on that date. Mr. Conder
then offered a copy of the order to Mr. Sturdy, counsel for UOSH.
Mr. Sturdy declined Mr. Conder's offer of a copy of the order. No
certificate of service was executed on June 10, 1992 when the order
was delivered to Mr. Conder.
As of June 16, 1992, Mr. Sturdy had not received a copy of the
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order and requested a copy from the adjudication divisionHe
received his copy of the order and a mailing certificate was
executed on June 16, 1992. Subsequently, UOSH filed its motion for
review on July 16, 1992. The respondent asserts that the motion
for review was untimely filed and asks that it be dismissed.
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the question of when an
order constituting final agency action is issued. Wiggins v. Board
of Review, 178 Ut^h Adv. Rep. 29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). In Wiggins,
the court held that n/ issue' as used in section 63-46b-14 (3) (a)
means the date the agency action is properly mailed as accurately
evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or personally served."
This definition of "issue" can legitimately be applied to 63-46b12, the section of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which
governs agency review of adjudicative proceedings.
This case involves an agency order which was signed and personally
delivered to the respondent on June 10, 1992 without preparation of
a mailing certificate. The complainant received the order with a
mailing certificate which shows an issuance date of June 16, 1992.
The date of issuance of an agency decision must be certain,
otherwise the jurisdiction of the agency or court to review an
agency order will be uncertain.
In this case, the confusion over the date of issuance stems from
the adjudication division's failure to properly prepare a
certificate of mailing and place its order in the mail on the date
the order was hand delivered to the respondent. However, to rule
that the order was issued on June 10, 1992 when the certificate of
mailing shows th^t the order was mailed on June 16, 1992 will
unfairly prejudice the complainant who relied on the date on the
mailing certificate in submitting its motion for review.
The
normal practice of the commission is to issue its orders by mail,
therefore, we believe that the order was not properly "issued" on
June 10, 1992 even though it was hand delivered to the respondent
on that date.
An order of the commission will not be considered

to have been "issued"

until

the date

it

is mailed

or hand delivered

to the parties accompanied by a properly executed mailing
certificate or certificate of service. The date on the mailing
certificate or certificate of service will be considered to be the
date the order was "issued" by the commission. We believe that
this approach is consistent with the recent opinion of the Utah
Court of Appeals in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep.
29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for review of the complainant in
this matter was timely filed based upon the date of issuance of the
order as reflected on the mailing certificate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall be given 15
days from the date of mailing of this order to file a response to
the complainant's motion for review, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section 63-46b-12.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

r^^^K^^^- / ^
Co?
lleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified this
ATTg^T:

> a t n c i a 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary

1992,

<<^^^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the INTERIAM
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS in the case of Industrial
Commission of Utah BY AND THROUGH THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION v.s MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Case Number
105638369, on y 2^t day of ^b^l^-'-^X
, 197ol to the
following:
JERRALD D. CONDER, ATTORNEY
4057 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY UTAH 84120
THOMAS STURDY, ATTORNEY
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
(intra-office mail)
DONALD L. GEORGE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
(intra-office mail)
JAY W. BAGLEY
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
(intra-office mail)

^rrfU£U*JX
Adell Butler-Mitchell
Paralegal

General Counsel's Office
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No. 105638639
Utah Occupational
Health and Safety Division,
Complainant,
vs.
Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*

*
*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
REVIEW

*

**************************** * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Complainant's Motion for Review of the administrative law judge's
(ALJ) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated June 10,
1992. The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 359-12, and Section 63-46b-12.
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June
10, 1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium
Corporation of America ("respondent11 or "Magcorp") on the iss^ue of
whether the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the
Industrial Commission of Utah ("UOSH") could place the cost of
providing flame resistant coveralls for its employees on \the
respondent. The citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH
required the respondeat to provide flame resistent coveralls to its
employees at no cost.
The ALJ issued an order granting the
respondent's motion for summary judgment finding that the citation
was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. On April 28, 1992,
Magcorp withdrew its objection to the citation and tendered payment
of the penalty due under the citation. Respondent's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, Exhibit C.
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSHA") provides
that the commission is "empowered to administer all laws and lawful
orders to ensure that every employee in this state has a workplace
free of recognized hazards." U.C.A. sec. 35-9-4 (1988).
The
commission has the "authority to assess all civil penalties
provided in this section, giving due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the
business of the employer charged, the gravity of the violation, the
good faith of the employer, and the history of any previous
violations by the employer."
I. WAS THE COST OF THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
REQUIRED BY UOSH PROPERLY ALLOCATED TO THE
RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES?
The ALJ relied on Budd Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201 (1975) in
ruling that the UOSH has no "legal or other authority to impose the
cost of uniquely personal equipment, such as the coveralls herein,
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upon Magcorp." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3, June
10, 1992. Budd held that 29 CFR 1910.132(a) did not mandate that
employers bear the cost of protective footwear required by the
regulation.
29 CFR 1910.132(a) provides that:
Protective equipment, including personal protective
equipment [ffPPEM ] for eyes, face, head, and extremities,
protective clothing, respiratory devices, and protective
shields and barriers, shall be provided, used and
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or
environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or
mechanical irritants encountered in a manner capable of
causing injury or impairment in the function of any part
of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical
contact (emphasis added).
29 CFR sec. 1910.132.
Subpart (b) provides that "where employees provide their own
protective equipment, the employer shall be responsible to assure
its adequacy, including proper maintenance, and sanitation of such
equipment." Id. In a footnote, the OSH Commission noted:
We do not imply that an employer is not obliged to bear
the cost of things such as capital equipment which it is
ordinarily his responsibility to assume. We are here
considering the cost allocation of personal equipment.
. . . Thus, the most universally used type of protection
[steel toed shoes] is uniquely personal and may be used
by the employee when he is away from the job (emphasis
added).
Id. n. 5.
A U.S. Department of Labor memorandum dated August 9, 1985,
discussed the issue of cost allocation for PPE. The memorandum
stated that it will be the position of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration that 29 CFR 1910.132 will be interpreted as
follows:
PPE that is uniquely personal, and which the employees
may well use away froit the job,, is the type that an
employer may require em;: .oyees to pay for. Exactly who
pays for this kind of PPE is a question to be resolved
between the employer and his employees—it is an
appropriate subject for collective bargaining. . . . as
a broad guideline, we can conclude that an employee may
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be required to pay for PPE that he alone will use, is of
a personal nature, and may be used away from the job.
OSHA Memorandum, August 9, 1985.
Thus, the question at issue is whether the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH are the type of PPE which is uniquely
personal to the wearer.
The UOSH asserts that the coveralls at issue are not uniquely
personal to the wearer as are the steel toed shoes in Budd. The
coveralls are sized like men's suits, i.e. 40, 42, etc., and many
bear the employee's name. The UOSH asserts that the coveralls are
contaminated with Fiberfrax, a carcinogenic ceramic fiber and
should not be worn home prior to being laundered. The Material
Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") for Fiberfrax specifies in relevant part
that:
. . . ceramic fiber should be handled with caution. The
handling practices described in this MSDS must be
strictly followed . . . It is recommended that full body
clothing should be worn to reduce the possibility of skin
irritation. Washable or disposable clothing may be used.
Do not take unwashed work clothing home. Work clothes
should be washed separately from other clothing. Rinse
washing machine thoroughly after use. If clothing is to
be laundered by someone else, inform launderer of proper
procedure clothes and street clothes should be kept
separate to prevent contamination (emphasis added).
MSDS at 6.
The UOSH argues that the coveralls in question are not safe to
be taken home or stored with other clothes without having first
been laundered and therefore are not appropriate to be worn away
from work. We agree that the MSDS requirements for laundering and
sequestering contaminated clothing, make the coveralls more unique
to the workplace than the individual employee. Magcorp has made
coin operated laundry facilities available to its employees in
order to address this concern. We believe that this response is
inadequate to properly provide for the safety of Magcorp employees.
The sizing of the coveralls in this case can be distinguished
from the sizing of the shoes in Budd.
Shoes, by their nature
adjust and conform to the foot of the wearer becoming "uniquely
personal" to the wearer.
Coveralls, do not generally become
"broken in" like a pair of shoes. The fit of a pair of coveralls
is much less personal and unique than a pair of steel toed shoes.
The coveralls may not be worn away from the workplace in the same
manner as steel toed shoes because they are contaminated with
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carcinogenic ceramic fibers.
Due to the contamination, the
coveralls must be laundered separately from other clothing and must
be laundered before taking them home. We believe that PPE which an
employee cannot readily wear home cannot realistically be
considered "uniquely personal11 to the employee.
The fact that the coveralls have the employee's name
embroidered on them does not, in and of itself, make the coveralls
uniquely personal to the wearer.
Names on uniforms and work
clothes can easily and inexpensively be changed to identify a new
wearer. We do not believe that the sizing of the coveralls makes
them unique to the wearer. Coveralls sized like men's suits could
easily be shared among several employees as long as they are of the
approximate same size. We therefore find that the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH in Magcorp's "hot end" are not uniquely
personal and that the cost of the coveralls should properly be
borne by the employer.
II. WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER IN THIS CASE?
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on Magcorp's
motion for summary judgment, heard argument and examined the
coveralls at issue. The ALJ then found that the coveralls were
uniquely personal protective equipment and concluded as a matter of
law that the cost of the coveralls could be placed on the employees
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then issued findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an order granting Magcorp / s motion for
summary judgment.
We don't believe that the order in this case should properly
be classified as one of summary judgment because there were
disputed questions of fact argued before the judge.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for review of the
complainant in this matter is hereby grantedFor the reasons
stated above, we find that the cost of the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH should properly be allocated to the
employer,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall provide, at no
cost to its employees, laundry service for the protective coveralls
that have been exposed to Fiberfrax as specified in the Material
Safety Data Sheet.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs for preparing a transcript for appeals purposes.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

<Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
I abstain because of prior discussion with
possibly related to the issues in this case.

corp officials

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this /7&J
ATTEST:

day of /d^s^L^J

1992.

^ ^ t ^ ) CO yfxJ.
Patricia O. Asliby
Commission Secretary
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Occupational Health and Safety Division v. Magnesium Corporation of
America first class postage prepaid, to the following;
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq,
CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorney for Magcorp
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley Cityf Utah 84120
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq.
Attorney for UOSH
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Donald L. George, Esq.
Administrative Law Judge
(hand delivered)

Sharon J, E b ^ n , ^Attorney
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No, 105638639
Industrial Commission of Utah
*
by and through the Occupational *
Health and Safety Division,
*
Complainant,
vs.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME

*
*

Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*
*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission11) reviews the
Complainant's Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to the limited
order of remand issued by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993.
On June 10, 1992 Judge Donald L. Georgev ("ALJ") issued an
order dismissing a citation issued by the Utah Occupational Safety
and Health Division ("UOSH") in connection with UOSH inspection
number 105638639.
The citation assessed a fine for the
Respondent's failure to provide flame retardant coveralls pursuant
to 29 CFR 1910.132. At the time of the citation, the respondent
required its employees to pay for flame retardant coveralls to be
used in the workplace. The ALJ found that the citation was void
and unenforceable as-a matter of law. On Motion for Review, the
Commission reversed the ALJ and ruled that the employer should
provide the flame retardant coveralls.
The Commission's Order was appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Court remanded the matter to the Commission for a
determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of
time to file its motion for review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b1(9), Our prior orders have not addressed the issue of good cause
for an extension of time because no extension was originally
requested. Under the law in existence at the time UOSH filed its
motion for review, the motion was timely filed.
DISCUSSION
1. GOOD CAUSE
UOSH asserts that it relied in good faith on Wiggins v. Board
of Review1 when it filed its motion for review.
UOSH further
asserts that both Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n2 and Bonded

1

824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992).

2

199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992).
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Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec.,3 were decided after UOSH
filed its motion for review on July 16, 1992.
The UOSH motion for review was filed thirty days from the date
the ALJ's Order was mailed relying upon the January 23, 1992
decision of the Court of Appeals in Wiggins. Wiggins held that the
date an agency order is issued is the date the order is mailed as
evidenced by the mailing certificate. On October 30, 1992, the
Utah Supreme Court held that an agency order is issued on the date
the order bears on its face, and not the date of mailing. Dusty's
at 9.
On December 4, 1992, the Court of Appeals in Bicycle
Couriers, held that Dusty's overruled Wiggins.
Magcorp asserts that UOSH has not shown good cause to justify
an extension of time under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA").
Magcorp further asserts that the time for filing a
motion for review is jurisdictional under Varian Eimac v.
Lamoreaux4 and that there is no specific statutory provision which
allows the Commission to extend the time for filing a motion for
review.
We believe that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) clearly authorizes the
Commission to grant an extension of time for filing a motion for
review for good cause shown. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial
Commission..s
UAPA provides that an "aggrieved party may file a
written request for review within 3 0 days after the issuance of an
order..."6 and that an agency may extend the time limits provided
for good cause shown.7 Maverik filed a motion for Commission
review of an administrative order one day late.
The Court of
Appeals recognized that, "absent
a showing
of good cause
for an
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires,
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over a review,
actual delivery of the necessary documents to the agency within the
thirty day time period." Maverick at 37. (emphasis added).
We conclude that the UOSH motion for review was timely filed
under the law in effect at the time of filing and that no extension
3

201 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ct. App. 1992).

4

767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989),

5

214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1993).

6

U.C.A. § 63-46b-12(l)(a).

7

The agency may extend "any time period prescribed in this
chapter, except those time periods prescribed for judicial review."
U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9).
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of time was necessary. However, we also hold that if an extension
of time is required then the subsequent change in the law
constitutes good cause for an extension of time.
2.

APPLICABILITY OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Magcorp asserts that Rule 6 U.R.C.P. applies to the equation
pursuant to Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P., and requires that UOSH show
excusable neglect before an extension of time may be granted by the
Commission. A showing of excusable neglect is not required. UOSH
relied on the law in effect at the time of filing, so it is not
necessary to show excusable neglect.
We believe that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
to agency actions under UAPA unless UAPA provides otherwise. In
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), the
Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e) and Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P.
could be applied to administrative procedures "except insofar as
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable." The Griffith
Court held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applied to extend the time for
filing a petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail.
Although footnote 1 in Lamoreaux opines that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P.
applies to extend the time for filing a motion for review, this
position was discarded by the Court of Appeals in Mayerik.8
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court noted that ff[w]hile the mode
of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in

the trial courts are not necessarily

applicable

to

administrative

proceedings.
See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) ....
Thus, administrative
proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
unless the governing statute or regulations so provide." Pilcher
v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah 1983) (emphasis
added). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
The UAPA provides

in relevant part, "except

provided by a statute
superseding
specific
reference to this chapter,

as otherwise

provisions
of this chapter by
the provisions of this chapter

apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. § 63-46b1(1) (1989) (emphasis added). The UAPA does not generally state
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative
proceedings.
To the contrary, the UAPA contains only limited,

214 U t . Adv. R e p . 3 4 , 3 6 - 3 7

( C t . App.

1993).
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specific references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure9.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The ALJ's Order was issued on June 10, 1992 and mailed to
the parties on June 16, 1992.
2. The Utah Division of Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH)
Motion for Review was filed with the Commission on July 16, 1992.
3. Under the January 23, 1992 order in Wiggins v. Board of
Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992), an agency order was
considered issued on the date it was mailed.
4. The Commission relied on the Wiggins decision in its
Interim Order of October 9, 1992 which held that the UOSH motion
for review was timely filed.
5. The law regarding the issuance of agency orders was changed
by the October 30, 1992 Order of the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty's
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992).
Under Dusty's, an order is considered issued on the date the order
bears on its face.
6. The UOSH relied in good faith on the Wiggins decision in
filing its motion for review on July 16, 1992.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Wiggins was the law in effect at the time UOSH filed its
motion for review. We believe that UOSH's reliance on the law at
the time of filing is good cause to support the grant of an
extension of time for filing.

9

See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (providing that Rules 12(b) and
56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment
except to the extent that those rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A.
§ 63-46b-7 (providing that the rules of discovery under the
U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not enacted rules for discovery);
U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that a defaulted party may file a
motion to set aside a default order under the procedures outlined
in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2) (providing that a petition
for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be
a complaint governed by the U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings
and proceedings in the district court are governed by the
U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-19(l)(c) (providing that the venue for
proceedings to enforce agency orders is governed
by the
requirements of the U.R.C.P.).
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We conclude that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to agency actions under UAPA unless expressly adopted under
UAPA. Therefore, UOSH must merely show good cause for an extension
under UAPA and does not need to meet the requirements of Rule 6 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complainant in this matter is
hereby granted an extension of time in which to file a motion for
review of the June 10, 1992 order of the administrative law judge.
DATED this <P>0

day of

OrZZ

1993.

\y^

yu

Stephen M. Had ey
Chairman

^

2

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
I abstain because of prior discussion with Magcorp officials
possibly related to the issues in this cgrse.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
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I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME in the case ofMAGNESIUM
CORPORATION, Case Number 105638639, on s^/)
day of
<<3<f£^ri(&,
19^-Sto the following:

THOMAS C. STURDY, ATTORNEY FOR
UTAH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JERRALD D. CONDER
PETER L. ROGNLIE
CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH

84120

DONALD L. GEORGE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell Butle^Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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